Nietzsche’s Dancers
By Kimerer L. LaMothe
Palgrave Macmillan, 2006
Reviewed by Arno Böhler, University of Vienna
Part I of Nietzsche’s Dancers weighs up the significance of dance images in Nietzsche’s texts. Step by step, Kimerer L. LaMothe locates the passages, in which she uses the word “dance,” from the The Birth of Tragedy till “The Works of 1888”. During the course of her interpretation she develops the notion that Nietzsche had “a vision for dance as theopraxis.” (LaMothe, 89).
Part II and III are discussing the influence of Nietzsche, as a “dancing philosopher,” on two famous philosopher-dancers, Isadora Duncan (Part II) and Martha Graham (Part III). LaMothe, herself a dancer and scholar in religious studies, is interested to juxtapose these three figures “to highlight the differences among them along points of mutual concern–namely, the revaluation of Christian attitudes toward bodily being” (xii).
What joins together all three of them is the common belief that more than two thousand years of Christian values have taught man to misunderstand his body. Since then “we are, physiologically considered, false;” (LaMothe 90, K6, 53; CW 192). Modern man is, biologically, a contradiction of values; “he sits between two chairs, he says Yes and No in the same breath’” (LaMothe, 90, K6, 52; CW 192)—since a body that embodies Christian values necessarily represents opposing values.
But this corporal status is not just the expression of a corrupt, weak and decadent body, in which everything “natural”, “instinctive” and “resolute” has been put under quotation marks and therefore removed from its own natural status. It can also express the condition of somebody who is able to transform his weakness into a gift, like Nietzsche did, when he supposed that his “sickness prevented him from conforming to the expectations placed upon him by his family, religion, profession, or society. It prevent[ed] him from acting unselfishly.” (LaMothe, 103). Through his sickness, Nietzsche became healthier than those whose health enables them to conform to what is expected to them. To put it in more general terms: the weakness of a condition can always become a driving force to overcome the status quo expressed by it. “Which of us would be a free spirit if the church did not exist?” (LaMothe, 88; K5, 270; GM I: 9,36).
The status of a body that represents a battlefield of contradicting values is therefore an ambivalent condition in itself. It can indicate a status of corporeal corruption and decadence as well as the status of a body, ready to revolt and emancipate itself from this condition, so that a Dionysian power can start to overrule and overcome the Christian heritage embodied in that body, in order to become, and make it, the body of a free spirit. “’Today there is perhaps no more decisive mark of a higher nature,’ a more spiritual nature, than that of being divided in this sense and a genuine battleground of these opposed values” (LaMothe, 82, K5, 286; GM I:16, 52).
A body that has become a battlefield of Dionysian and Christian values is almost pre-destined or most suitable to become a concrete, local place, in which a physiological revolt against Christianity takes place in order to ex-scribe (Nancy) and overwrite (Derrida) it from its Christian heritage and make it the home, place and embodiment of a Dionysian power that has started to govern the constitution of a body (Foucault) and rule its bodily formation (Butler).–For LaMothe it is precisely dance—dance as a bodily practice—that is the main means to induce this physiological transformation in a body in order to create it anew. Regenerating a Christian body, while transforming it through dance into a dancing body, a Dionysian “dancing star”, is precisely the form of theopraxis that becomes necessary, historically, in a historic moment, in which God has been declared dead. A free spirit, thus, can be defined as a person “unbound by convention, tradition, or habit, having the vitality and discernment needed to do what is necessary for her own health—one who finds in the death of God an occasion to love her bodily becoming” (LaMothe, 56). A “daring dance” is what a free spirit does in performing a cultural bodily transformation. “In the end, the difference between the bound and free spirits is not one of intelligence or will, but energy” (LaMothe, 40).
To practice dance means nothing else than to resist Christian values physiologically. But to induce such a bodily transformation in a corrupted body, it is not enough, for LaMothe, to reread and overwrite a “false” body in a deconstructing, literary manner only. Prior to this literary practice one has to practice dance as well as a muse that precisely works “in an opposite and complementary direction to that opened by the acts of reading and writing” (LaMothe, 45). However, every artist per se is “a person who has not forgotten his bodily becoming, and who, in making art, speaks to the artist in each of us” (LaMothe, 98). What is special about a dancer is that she “communicates movements, kinetic signs, and not only semantic significance” (LaMothe, 98). A dancer works with the physiological aspects of a signifier rather then with its fixed semantic meaning. While doing this, she makes an end with a misunderstanding that “consists in understanding the body as a thing rather than a process of its own becoming” (LaMothe, 101).
From this it becomes clear that, first of all, every “table of values” requires a physiological investigation and interpretation rather than a psychological one. Even when one reads and interprets philosophy, one has to read and analyze the physiology of the body that philosophizes first, in order to understand the moral judgments, literary expressions and content of a text. In other words, Nietzsche reads “our conception of and relationship to ‘the body’ as a symptom of our physiological health” (LaMothe, 101).

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Nietzsche’s Dancers