

# Ex-silentio Eloquence

a review of

## The Extravagant

by Camelia Elias

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
HYPERION

On the future of aesthetics

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# Ex-silentio Eloquence

poetry and philosophy in the middle of it



a review of

***The Extravagant:  
Crossings of Modern Poetry  
and Modern Philosophy***

**Robert Baker**

**University of Notre Dame Press, 2005**

**E**

x-tra-va-gant. This is how we should render graphically

by **Camelia Elias**

this adjective. The idea of extravagance itself is made up of paratextual elements: 'ex' for out; 'tra' for crossings, 'va' for forward, 'g(r)ant' for reward. Extra-vagrancy. Drift some more. Drifting aimlessly towards the margins is a rewarding act, although as it often goes for margins, they are not for everybody. A simple dissection of the word, such as the one above, gives us a brief, yet illustrative insight into what is at stake in the extravagant, namely, the desire to be different, the desire to transcend, transform and crisscross the mundane, and the desire to occupy a liminal space from whence the experience of something excessive can be thought of as gratifying. Nowhere is the extravagant better represented than in poetry. Ever since the ancient Greeks have defined the *peritton*, the extravagant has formally been associated with poetry. At the level of content the extravagant has been associated with prophesy. As the prophet's language is a language of imitation—the aim is to have the divine reveal itself through language—the primary concern of the prophet is not how to put the divine into words, but how to experience it, and then pass it on.

In its more modern connotative form, the extravagant suggests a highlighting of the emotional aspect inherent in extravagance—the extravagant is extravagant also because it is conscious of itself being extravagant. Extravagant emotion conjures a sensual experience that goes beyond the intellect but not before crossing it, traversing it. The extravagant opens itself onto the kind of poetic language that hammers excess into prophetic genius. Here I like what the extravagant among extravagant poets, Gerard Manley Hopkins, has to say about the act of prophesying as it ties in with poetic language and philosophy—the latter concerned with the question of the form and function of the extravagant. A prophet's language is "that language which genius speaks as fitted to its exaltation, and place among other genius, but does not sing in its flights" (Letter to A. W. M. Baillie, 10/11 Sept. 1864).<sup>1</sup> All writers concerned with the question of genius point to the necessity of form as style to carry their messages through. Baker quotes Hopkins in passing: "It will flame out, like shining from shook foil" (31). The often vagrant prophets, often prophesying about some ominous vagary, have the extravagant built into their very nature. As they often perceive themselves in terms of wholeness, they thus also embody margins, or extremes. As such they can be thought of as being the product of their own interpretations, of what is marginal or central, what is extravagant or conventional. These interpretations in turn can be said to produce their own literatures (of exegesis one might add), poetics, and style.

Here it is interesting to note that existing studies on the concept of the extravagant, the most recent and the object of this review, Robert Baker's *The Extravagant: Crossings of Modern Poetry and Modern Philosophy*, tend to emphasize a period, rather than a sense of continuation where the manifestation of the extravagant is concerned. (I'm thinking here also of M.

E. Edes and Dudley Frasier's study from 1954, *The Age of Extravagance: An Edwardian Anthology*, which Baker incidentally doesn't mention in his survey).

Any study of the extravagant that focuses on periodization is bound to answer the charge with constraint and take issue with the tension inherent in the definition of the extravagant as that which resists being contained. As the extravagant suggests wandering, escaping time, floating aimlessly, and probing poetic vision from the vantage point of prophetic power, the extravagant contaminates rather than lets itself be conjured up by a container.

Baker's book does a good job in showcasing this awareness that the extravagant, while restricted to modern manifestations, is always articulated against the background of transcendence, and hence it is a-historical. Thus, while the book emphasizes the modern period, it also treats with equal measure concepts such as the sublime (in Kant, Wordsworth, and Lyotard), visionary quests and revisions (in Rimbaud, Nietzsche, and Bataille), and apocalyptic negativity (in Kierkegaard, Dickinson, Mallarmé, and Derrida).

At first eye glance, one is tempted to ask how Baker would pull off juxtaposing thinkers who have been influenced by Romanticism and avant-gardist concerns, on the one hand, with modern takes on concepts that have resisted becoming part of the instrumentalization of discursive and critiquing frameworks, on the other hand. But Baker anticipates this question quite early on. Especially Habermas and Allan Megill (author of the seminal study, *Prophets of Extremity* (1985)) are squared off against and criticized for not being very specific in their theories of how both modern art and philosophy have been influenced by the Romantic tradition. In their broad claims, argues Baker, about the ways in which Romanticism has been appropriated by philosophers but only so that they can formulate dystopian views of modernity, neither Habermas nor Megill engage in analyses of specific art works. Against this background, says Baker about his own project, which is central to his book:

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I place poets and philosophers in close communication with one another in order to elucidate some of the similar paths they've pursued in their ambivalent engagements with modernity. Poets are not simply "myth-makers" who come along to seduce irresponsible philosophers, as both Megill and Habermas tend to suggest. They are writers who *think* and *engage the world* in their poems, which is a primary reason why they've had much to say to a number of Continental philosophers over the last two centuries. (10-11; author's emphasis)

I like this idea. However, I wouldn't dismiss so quickly the notion that poets are primarily, indeed, in the business of seducing—not irresponsible, as that would be rather uninteresting, but especially responsible—philosophers. Megill, for instance makes this point when he takes a poet such as Edmond Jabès to show how the poet embodies the philosopher and the philosopher embodies the poet, all in one, in that vision of excess which situates itself at the extremity of what one might call the limits of prophesying. Megill's book *Prophets of Extremity*—whose subtitle directly engages philosophers by their names, and in an order that suggests performative contradictions: *Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida*—is more concerned with what philosophers perform when they don't really say anything, when they let their texts become their own interpretations. For Megill, someone like Jabès creates the link that Baker would like to see enforced between the rational, or responsible, philosophers and the emotional, or irresponsible, poets. For Megill, the site of extremity that the above mentioned philosophers embody is mediated by poets such as Jabès who have articulated philosophical positions for poetry as poetry and philosophy *par excellence*. For instance, Jabès's statement in his supremely poetic and prophetic *The Book of Questions* leads the way in Megill's book and functions also as a specific 'artwork' in itself which invites the reader to consider what a poem does in its philosophical thrust: namely, run a risky business—seducing philosophers being one of them. More poignantly and concretely, "a poem always runs the risk of being meaningless, and would be nothing without this risk."

While the point here is not to offer a double review of Baker and Megill's works, I want to stress the significance of the thought that sees extravagance and extremity not as contained within any one period but transcending time precisely through their inherent and meta-performative (extravagant and extreme) nature. Thus, the tension between containing transcendent thought within a certain period must be considered. Megill does it. In Baker's scheme, the poem as a risk is seen as a rite of passage that philosophy has to go through if it wants to stand the chance of articulating anything interesting. The intersection between poetry and philosophy can thus only be made sense of at the juncture where the extravagant paves the way.

On a larger scale, Baker's concern with the extravagant is not so much in terms of what is at stake—the risqué element in modern poetry—but in terms of the power of agency that the "translocative" function of the extravagant exerts on both poetry and philosophy. By way of quoting Osip Mandelstam, Baker defines the translocative thus: "What distinguishes poetry from automatic speech is that it rouses us and shakes us into wakefulness in the middle of a word. Then it turns out that the word is much longer than we thought, and we remember that to speak means to be forever on the road"

(5). For Baker, the stretched middle position via coercing words, as it were, in addition to other forms of transitions invests poetry with a negative kind of energy. Thus, creativity must be understood against the background of the negative. For instance, the transition from rural to urban concerns, agrarian to industrial machines, marks the displacement of older forms of cultural and religious manifestations and beliefs. As Baker rightly points out, the tensions that arise from these transitions create discourses of dispersing and erring through “the languages of unmaking and undoing, of dislodging and decentering, of negativity and indeterminacy” (13). As these are central aspects within negative dialectics, Baker proposes to unfold the notion of the extravagant through the prism of dedication—the assumption is here that any extravagant act must involve a degree of dedication that here we encounter both as a paratextual exercise and also as a performative. Following Yves Bonnefoy, again by way of quoting, Baker thus states in the beginning: “I dedicate this book to the improbable, that is to say, to what is” (3). The extravagant is not only “what is,” but also what we can’t figure out: the excess, the flamboyant, the extreme, the wandering beyond.

In the first cluster of texts, Baker analyzes the sublime through Kant, Wordsworth, and Lyotard—the latter because his work combines romantic and modernist poetics. Baker argues that through a reading of Lyotard the modernist project of setting in motion invention, metamorphosis, and otherness becomes more apparent when seen against the background of Kant’s romantic dialectics of unsettling and recovering the subject. As the poetry and philosophy of these three reflect the subject in motion as it departs from traditional models of representation, imagination takes over. But while Wordsworth, for instance, identifies the imaginative power as a subversive potential, for Kant imagination encompasses the thinking of an unrepresentable alterity. Baker makes a clear point here regarding the relation between transcendence, the sublime, and the notion of vocation—the latter as it also gets picked up by later (more modernist than romantic) poets and philosophers who rename it as “nomadic” thought. One need only think of Jabès again, a poet who, although peculiarly absent from Baker’s study, has influenced philosophers such as Derrida, whose poetic vision Baker, however, brilliantly charts in his last chapter. So the point in the first chapter is to demonstrate that if thought wanders and is in search of words to represent the poet, the poet’s task is in turn to find a voice that would articulate the relation between dangerous solipsism and ethical objectivity. The experience of the sublime, which Kant, Wordsworth, and Lyotard are trying to uncover, remains, however, just that: an experience that a drifting subject articulates within the boundaries of displacement and indeterminacy. Thus, insofar as boundaries constrain thinking, even if it’s the thinking of what *can* be imagined, it is informed by constricting instrumentality and is therefore not so radical. Insofar as Baker is interested in tracing just how extravagant radical thought can be,

he shows that from the “*dialectic of instrumental reason and creative negativity* which has been at work throughout modern culture” (45; author’s emphasis), there is a necessary move towards visionary metamorphosis (discussed in the second part/chapter of the book) and thence on to the “sounding of boundless negativity” (discussed in the third part/chapter of the book).

Baker’s second chapter deals with another cluster of three authors: Rimbaud, Nietzsche, and Bataille. Here, Baker takes his cue from Nietzsche’s Zarathustra when he decides that the translocative function of the extravagant assumes other proportions. For instance, quite literally, Baker allows Zarathustra to speak through him, and as befits Zarathustra he then puts words in Baker’s mouth thus dictating: the dynamics of the three mentioned above must be that of “going under” and “crossing over.” Words in this chapter wander from volatile imagination to concrete faces: of destroyed idolatry (in Nietzsche), of transfiguration (in Rimbaud), and of ecstatic and ruinous eroticism (in Bataille). The word of illumination passed through such disfigured and transformed mouths can only be a word of Faustian prophecy. What I myself find wonderful in the three poet-philosophers discussed is their irreverent approach to the notion of the sublime. I try to imagine them as 60s trendsetters, getting high on drugs, smashing love and procreation myths, and instituting a state of “rapturous crisis.” The only thing missing from their aesthetic program is championing women’s liberation movement. Baker is at his best in this middle passage, and it is clear that he deliberately lets his heroes channel his own language through the discourse of the negative.

Unlike in the first three, Kant, Wordsworth, and Lyotard, for whom the message is the medium—thought itself as mediated by imagination is sublime—for Nietzsche, Rimbaud, and Bataille, the medium is the message: bring in the hammer, off with their heads. Such concreteness doesn’t go unnoticed. The extravagant here thus gives itself through a level of concreteness that surpasses abstractness. The stoned prophet limits his world to experiencing it through simple articulation, as if saying: ‘the sublime, that’s beautiful, man!’ The tension between high and low collisions and crises of representation—between that which cannot be represented, the *je-ne-sais-quoi*, and that which can be known by way of repetition (vernacular wisdom is usually passed down through lots of swearing)—is eased first by Nietzsche’s craft—he paved the stone road with the smashed pieces from solid thought edifices—then by Rimbaud’s metaphysics, and then by Bataille’s insistence on bringing theology close to one’s underwear—no priest’s black vestment here, only pink bodies.

With Zarathustra leading the way, Baker suggests that Nietzsche invests energy in the fragment, Rimbaud in the ruin, and Bataille in the remains. The consequence is that they thus produce “crisis texts” all the way through. But the crisis text itself creates a certain kind of energy in turn—an energy that

can only be channeled through dialogue. Here it's interesting to note how Baker himself engages in dialogue not only with the authors he discusses but also with their protagonists. I quote an exchange to illustrate. First says Zarathustra:

“

Verily, my friends [...] I walk among men as among the fragments and limbs of men. This is what is terrible for my eyes, that I find man in ruins and scattered as over a battlefield or a butcherfield. And when my eyes flee from the now to the past, they always find the same: fragments and limbs and dreadful accidents—but no human beings. (Z, 138) (94)

And then says Baker:

“

All three, therefore, affirm that a movement destroying the structures that have ruined us—structures at once internal and external—is inseparable from a movement unloosing buried powers. A destructive voyage through the dark, a Faustian version of the “dark night of the soul,” is imagined as the path leading to a creative light and an altered horizon. This is of course a familiar mythic and religious pattern, one of particular importance in apocalyptic, gnostic, and mystical traditions. (95)

What is well demonstrated in this chapter is that the Faustian quest leaves from a premise that the creative and metamorphic horizon towards which all movement is made is necessarily made up not by the wandering of the figure of the One but by the Other.

In the third part, which is also the third and last chapter of the book, Baker talks about “apocalyptic soundings of abyssal negativity” in Kierkegaard, Dickinson, Mallarmé, and Derrida. So things can only get better. If the previous three authors had a solid ground on which to unfold their philosophies—with Zarathustra’s walking up the mountain to have a better view of the horizon as a concatenation of heights of despair—here the operative wandering word is “boundless.” Baker is good at emphasizing the seminal keywords in the abysmal four authors, yet it is interesting to note that in spite of what the word “abyss” conjures in terms of intangibility—the ‘nothing’ that is—the images are always very graphic. Thus, we have in Kierkegaard the phrase “keeping the wound of the negative open”; Derrida goes solo in an act of self-representation

manifested in the figure of “the last of the eschatologists”; and Dickinson and Mallarmé perform an active “unmooring” of subjectivity from earlier stale metaphysical ideas.

Although Baker doesn’t mention the phrase, “the law of the excluded middle” is what informs the whole of this chapter. This foundational principle in logic states that something must be either A or not A, but not both. The ‘both’ is the middle position that is excluded by the law. Baker sees particularly Dickinson and Mallarmé as embodiments of both the romantic and the modernist traditions, and he aligns them with Nietzsche. The trio of the excluded middle opens the door for “going where you cannot go.” Baker quotes this phrase from Angelus Silesius<sup>2</sup> and points to Derrida’s identifying this *topos en passage*, as it were, as “a ‘messianic’ expectation emptied of any concrete ‘messianism’ “ (44). One can make the inference that this is the law of the excluded middle in action.<sup>3</sup> Baker’s claim is that Derrida’s deconstructive philosophy draws both on Nietzsche and avant-gardist “rhetorics of hyperbole” when he emphasizes the extravagant as occupying the counter-paradoxical middle position (in opposition to the high point of a hyperbole). As Baker puts it, in Derrida: “there is a drift that drifts through things” (256). What is suggested here is that apocalyptic negativity—one wanders and wanders from end to end, not from beginning to end, or through the “Desert of the Promise” as envisaged by Derrida’s eschatological vision—is a form of liberating freedom.<sup>4</sup> Says Baker in a central passage:



Derrida’s discourse of the “ruin of presence” can be read as an inventive turn in a long tradition of prophets and poets who—whether in despair, elation, or both at once—have explored the “ruin of the finite” as bafflingly disclosive, enigmatically promising. “Not only is there no kingdom of difference but difference instigates the subversion of every kingdom” (MP, 22). This sort of language [...] belongs not only to a tradition of modern poetry but also to a tradition of prophetic or apocalyptic expectation within both Judaism and Christianity. The crossing of freedom, according to a tradition reaching back to the biblical prophets, begins with a shattering of the many idols of our bondage [...] It is a tradition that in modern culture has been reinvented, above all, in passages of the extravagant in romantic and modernist poetry and in critical philosophies written in communication with these passages. And these passages frequently evoke a movement of exodus [...] This movement often sounds like an invocation of some opening toward which we are able to reach only in riddles. Kierkegaard calls it the passion of the infinite. Dickinson figures it as a

participation in the mystery and the distance of vanishing. Mallarmé explores it as a virtual death of the poet passing through a ghostly play of words in echo. Derrida characterizes it as the ruin of the present obliquely disclosing the impossible. They are all going where they cannot go. For that (among other reasons) we were given words. (257-258).

As a natural consequence of going where one cannot go, being both here and not here, a Messiah and Faust, a prophet and a profaner of the gravity of thought, Baker's book ends with an epilogue (after a concluding chapter that detours through a host of other authors, notably, for instance, André Breton and T.S. Eliot) called "The Miracle of Place." This is a brilliant move to considering poets such as Paul Celan, George Oppen, and Geoffrey Hill, for whom the radical, the extreme, and the extravagant situate themselves miraculously not in the margins but right in the middle of things. If Kierkegaard has been famously known for his attempts to understand the meaning of making a leap of faith, if Nietzsche has been notorious for his saying that, in Baker's rendition, "not everyone has the right to his prophetic thought" (163), if Rimbaud has achieved celebrity status for always posing disturbingly right questions, such as this one: "What is my nothingness compared to the stupor that awaits you?" (*Oeuvres*, 264), in the epilogue, Celan, Oppen, and Hill make eloquent the silence that necessarily institutes itself after faith is rendered in skeptical terms, prophesy in visions of metamorphic power rather than an unknown yet ruinous future, and nothingness as a potential for movement.

George Oppen kept silent 25 years after having written some very interesting essays and poems in the 30s. He became a political activist and did not return to poetry until the late 50s, when his writing career also culminated with the Pulitzer Prize in 1969. Thus, one reads his line in one of the poems "the open/ Miracle// Of Place" as a sounding of his name beyond the boundless. What the open miracle of space suggests is that the place where we cannot go, but do go, is a locus where questions are posed beyond skepticism: "Belief?/ What do we believe?/ To live with? Answer./ Not invent—just answer—all/ That verse attempts./ That we can somehow add to each other?" (*Collected Poems*, 52) Baker chooses to juxtapose the Structuralist framework of the oppositional and ultimately adversarial pair, question and answer, with the suggestion that silence, as it passes through poetic vision, is articulated against a throwing movement. The epigraph to the whole book, a quote from Celan, clearly indicates that much: "Discus,/ Starred with premonitions,/ throw yourself out of yourself." This is how poetic language works: through ex-locutio eloquence. Baker quotes Geoffrey Hill, who enhances this thought:



Even now, I tell myself, there is a language  
to which I might speak and which  
would rightly hear me;  
responding with eloquence; in its turn,  
negotiating sense without insult  
given or injury taken.  
Familiar to those who already know it  
elsewhere as justice,  
it is met also in the form of silence.  
(The Triumph of Love, XXXV, 18-19)

The point is that, in poetry, it is impossible to create too much narrative. If one comes close to that, one can blame it on quotes. My quoting the poets, here, instead of Baker, is a demonstration of the fact that if extravagance occurs, it does so by virtue of “spacing,” as Derrida would have it. Via Keats, for whom Psyche without Eros is at a loss, Baker makes the final point that vision without companionship is like an abiding openness that does not allow for the mystery of ‘nothing’ to reveal itself as a miracle of place. The miracle of place, and by extension also space, is itself an extravagant passage between the kind of articulation that comes out of nothing and its elaboration within the framework of what Baker calls “abiding interanimation.” Ex-locutio eloquence thus becomes an open space where ex-silentio eloquence can unfold itself. In her seminal work, *The Human Condition*, Hannah Arendt elaborates a notion of a community that constitutes itself through active reasoning. Through action, Arendt, intimates, a community is able to create better dilemmas for itself. Such a community of reason is a boundless community.<sup>5</sup> Although Baker does not engage with Arendt, however useful that may have been, he does make a similar point in his linking the boundless with a strong sense of a ‘reasoning’ community when discussing Oppen’s poetics of appropriation through quotation. Oppen’s master opus *Of Being Numerous* is an example of ‘being in the world’ through interanimation and through networks of connections. I would suggest here that what an ‘interanimated’ community does, in terms of action, is articulate a middle position for the proliferations of relations. *Being* ‘in the middle of it,’ inhabiting “all limitations” and “all boundaries,” is not a static relation but a traversing action or form of *becoming* one of the numerous. Thus, spoke the poets, and the philosophers follow.

In conclusion, and in good extravagant fashion, I’ll say this: Baker’s book is absolutely fascinating, interesting, and compelling, in spite of its forcing the reader to wander almost to exhaustion—but then such is the nature of both the extravagant and the negative. (Note: I feel tempted to quote Emperor Joseph

II in the film *Amadeus* who, although clueless, insists on pointing out to Mozart what he thinks is wrong with one of his pieces: “too many notes.”) (That being said in parenthesis,) Baker’s study furthermore is not only an intelligent read but also a tool which enhances any reader’s capacity to think the unthinkable, the unimaginable, the unrepresentable, and the unsaid. This is no small accomplishment. In the days when ad hoc solutions to all things are more valued than the imaginative way we take to get there, or the ingenious process we devise in order to heighten our sense of language, a book such as Baker’s is a reminder of the fact that what makes the world go round is not saying yes to everything, but saying no to all affirmations of conventionality. One must thus praise not only the writer but also the publisher for daring to perform extravagant acts—such as posing the question and its answer in the form of a counter-question: poetry or philosophy?—is there is difference? In thinking this difference itself, “for that, we were given [more] words.”

## NOTES

<sup>1</sup> The context for Gerard Manley Hopkins is a meditation on three kinds of poetic language induced by inspiration on different levels. (We find here Hopkins's notions of different kinds of moods, or poetic idioms, such as the Parnassian and the Castalian (the lowest kind of inspiration).) "The second kind I call Parnassian. It can only be spoken by poets, but is not in the highest sense poetry. It does not require the mood of mind in which the poetry of inspiration is written. It is spoken on and from the level of a poet's mind, not, as in the other case, when the inspiration, which is the gift of genius, raises him above himself. For I think it is the case with genius that it is not when quiescent so very much above mediocrity as the difference between the two might lead us to think, but that it has the power and privilege of rising from that level to a height utterly far from mediocrity: in other words that its greatness is that it can be so great." (Letter to A.W. M. Baillie)

<sup>2</sup> Silesius (1624-1677) was a German mystic and poet from Silesia (Poland). His view of aesthetics, the claim that the experience of the infinite can only be experienced in a finite form, has influenced authors interested in formal experimental literature such as Jorge Luis Borges and Geoffrey Hill, whose theological vision employs some of Silesius's Catholic imagery. Notable in this sense is Hill's collection of poetry *The Triumph of Love* (2000). One of Silesius's most often quoted phrases is one that alludes to the phenomenology of things that can be contained by a decision not to explain anything: "Die Rose ist ohne warum; Sie blühet, weil Sie blühet . . ."

<sup>3</sup> The temptation here is to go even more formalistically and at least mention the work of Nicolai A. Vasiliev who in 1910 presented a lecture, "On Partial Judgements, on the Triangle of Opposites, on the Law of Excluded Fourth," in which he advanced a theory for logic to go the imaginative way as against Aristotelian logic which is constrained to laws of contradiction. What is fascinating about Vasiliev's theory is that his notion of "imaginary logic" is free of the law of the excluded middle. As such, it is applicable and valid for other worlds and beings having other types of sensations that do not submit to contradiction laws. More current and interesting work in this area is done by Jaakko Hintikka. See for example Hintikka's *The Principles of Mathematics Revisited* (1996) and Vincent F. Hendricks (ed.) *Philosophy of Mathematics: 5 Questions* (2006).

<sup>4</sup> In an analogy to physics, we find a correlate in quantum mechanics. Not only has quantum mechanics done away with the law of the excluded middle, but it has also done away with both ends.

<sup>5</sup> Says Arendt: "boundless [community] because action, though it may proceed from nowhere [...] acts into a medium where every reaction becomes a chain reaction and where every process is the cause of new processes. [...] This boundlessness is characteristic not of political action alone, [...] the smallest act in the most limited circumstances bears the seed of the same boundlessness, because one deed, and sometimes one word, suffices to change every constellation. Action, moreover, no matter what its specific content, always establishes relationships and therefore has an inherent tendency to force open all limitations and cut across all boundaries" (Arendt, 190-191). I particularly like what Lynn Hejninian has to say about this in her essay "Reason," from *The Language of Inquiry* (2000): "Authority over being is thus dispersed, not *because* of the boundlessness, but *in* the boundlessness. We don't—as writers or as persons—go beyond "all limitations" and "all boundaries"—we enter and inhabit them" (352).

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